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1The dynamics of the impact of past performance on
mutual fund °ows
Abstract
This study reconsiders the determinants of °ows into US growth funds, focusing in
particular on the dynamics of the impact of past performance on °ows. We model the
°ow-performance relationship at the monthly frequency, allowing for dependence of the
sensitivity of °ows to past performance on size and age of the fund. The dynamics of
the impact of past performance is modelled using polynomial lag structures. Performance
f r o m6t o8m o n t h sa g os e e m st oh a v et h es t r o n g e s ti m p a c to nn e t° o w st oU Sg r o w t h
funds. We observe that performance during the most recent quarter is less important than
performance during the remaining three quarters of the ¯rst year, suggesting that some
investors react to fund performance with a certain lag. Speci¯cations based on average
past performance at annual or quarterly frequency are strongly rejected. The ¯rst three
years of past performance history account for about 90 percent of the total impact of past
performance on °ows. The well-documented convexity of the °ow-performance relationship
appears robust to allowing for dependence of this relationship on size and age of the fund.
The return on systematic risk factors has a small additional impact on top of the impact
of risk-adjusted returns.
Keywords: °ow-performance relationship, investor behavior.
JEL Classi¯cation:G 1 1 .
21 Introduction
Many studies have recently analyzed the determinants of the behavior of mutual fund
investors, concentrating on the relation between net in°ows to mutual funds and their past
performance. This research is of obvious relevance both for managers of mutual funds and
their regulators. For the managers, it is important to know the factors that determine the
total net assets under management which drive their compensation. The regulators should
be aware of the incentives for risk-taking induced to managers by the existing investor
behavior patterns.
The stylized ¯ndings indicate a clear positive impact of both risk-adjusted as well as raw
past performance on subsequent net in°ows (see, e.g., Ippolito [1992] and Gruber [1996]).
The relationship appears convex, indicating that most of the in°ows are attracted by the
best performing funds (see, e.g., Chevalier and Ellison [1997] and Sirri and Tufano [1998]).
Flows are also directly related to fund visibility, as funds belonging to larger families (see
Sirri and Tufano [1998]) and funds advertising in the ¯nancial magazines (see Jain and Wu
[1999]) tend to attract larger °ows. Moreover, °ows into a fund are found to be positively
related to the performance of the fund family, measured, e.g., as average performance within
the family (see, e.g., Ivkovic [2000]) or through the presence of star performers in the family
(see, e.g., Nanda, Wang, and Zheng [2000]). Barber, Odean, and Zheng [2001] ¯nd that
fund °ows are more sensitive to the salient fees such as loads and commissions than to
operating expenses. Del Guercio and Tkac [2000] document that mutual fund investors use
l e s ss o p h i s t i c a t e dm e a s u r e so ff u n dp e r f o r m a n c et h a np e n s i o nf u n dc l i e n t s .
The ¯ndings on the °ow-performance relationship can be compared to the predictions
based on the literature on performance persistence of mutual funds (see, e.g., Hendricks,
Patel, and Zeckhauser [1993], Chevalier and Ellison [1999], Wermers [2000], Baks, Metrick,
and Wachter [2001], and many others). In general, these studies ¯nd strong evidence of
persistence among bad performers and mixed evidence for consistent superior persistence.
This implies that the relationship between fund °ows and past performance should be the
strongest among the worst-performing funds, which is opposite to the observed pattern (see
Sirri and Tufano [1998]). This di®erence can be explained by a number of institutional
and psychological factors, which prevent large out°ows from funds with bad past perfor-
mance. Market frictions such as the presence of search costs, back-end load charges, tax
considerations, and restrictions of the investment retirement plans increase the transaction
costs of withdrawing money from the poorly performing funds, while status-quo bias (see
Zeckhauser, Patel, and Hendricks [1991]) and cognitive dissonance bias (see Goetzmann
and Peles [1997]) make investors ignore information about bad fund performance.
Most studies referred to above focus on the impact of average past performance on
fund °ows at an annual frequency. In contrast, we analyze the full dynamic structure of
3the °ow-performance relationship at the monthly frequency. As noted by Geweke [1978],
low (e.g., annual) frequency analysis of the °ow-performance relationship can be biased in a
non-trivial way, if the true link is at higher frequency, and clearly cannot reveal the full high
frequency lag structure. We ¯nd that performance from 6 to 8 months ago has the strongest
impact on net °ows to US growth funds. The performance during the most recent quarter
appears less important than performance during the rest of the past year. This suggests
that information dissemination takes time and some investors react to fund performance
with a certain lag. The ¯rst three years of performance history account for about 90%
of the total impact of past performance on °ows. Moreover, almost all studies referred
to above assume that the °ow-performance sensitivity is constant. We ¯nd evidence that
relative °ows of small and, to a lesser extent, young funds are much more sensitive to past
performance than larger and older funds.
As stated above, many studies (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison [1997] and Sirri and Tufano
[1998]) have found a convex °ow-performance relationship, indicating that funds with top
recent performance attract most of the in°ows. This stylized ¯nding, together with the
fact that the manager's compensation is typically a percentage of the fund's net assets (see
Khorana [1996]), has lead to the hypothesis that managers of funds with poor performance
in the ¯rst half of the year have an incentive to increase risk in the second half of the year.
Tests of this hypothesis have been reported, e.g., by Brown, Harlow and Starks [1996],
Busse [2001], and Goriaev, Nijman, and Werker [2001]. We ¯nd in the present paper that
the convexity of the °ow-performance relationship is robust to allowing for more °exible
dynamic lag structures and dependence of the °ow-performance sensitivity on age and size
of the fund. This convexity appears to be mostly due to the di®erence in °ows between
the top performing half of the funds and bottom performing half of the funds. However,
within each of these two segments the °ow-performance relationship is close to linear, which
suggests that primarily funds with the average performance have incentives to take excessive
risk.
Finally, we ¯nd that the return on systematic risk factors in the last two years or so has
a small positive impact on °ows in excess of the impact of the risk-adjusted returns. This
might indicate that mutual investors are style timers.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the
data set and methodology and discusses the relation between the typical model used in
the literature and our basic model speci¯cation. In Section 3, we compare the empirical
results based on the two models. We also discuss our ¯ndings concerning the lag structure
of the °ow-performance relationship. In Section 4, we estimate the lag structure over a
longer period (from 1976 to 1998), using quarterly data on funds' total net assets in 1976-
1990. Sections 5 and 6 present the results concerning the convexity of the °ow-performance
4relationship and additional impact of raw returns on °ows (in excess of the risk-adjusted
returns), respectively. Section 7 concludes.
2D a t a a n d m e t h o d o l o g y
The data employed in our analysis are provided by Micropal. The data set includes the
month of fund foundation, total net assets, and total returns of the US funds for the period
January 1970 to December 1998. While returns are available at the monthly frequency
throughout this period, total net asset values are available at monthly frequency from
December 1990 and at quarterly frequency in 1970-1990. The main sample period in our
study is consequently taken as January 1991 to December 1998. In Section 4, we also
incorporate the quarterly data on funds' total net assets in a period before 1991. In order
to avoid heterogeneity based on di®erences in fund styles, we perform the analysis on US
growth funds only. Since we use a ¯ve-year horizon for fund performance, our analysis is
restricted in each month to the funds with at least ¯ve years of the return history. Note
that we have annualized monthly returns and °ows in order to make our results comparable
to existing evidence, which is based on the annual data.
In order to reduce the impact of typos and mergers, we exclude from our data set 1%
of outliers based on net relative °ows (0.5% of funds with the largest positive relative °ows
and 0.5% of funds with the largest negative relative °ows). In order to concentrate on
the °ow-performance relationship for moderately sized funds and avoid that the results
are determined by outliers, we also excluded 1% of the observations with the largest size,
which belong to only 6 funds and span from 11 to over 80 billion dollars. Table 1 presents
descriptive statistics of the fund characteristics. During the main sample period (1991-
1 9 9 8 ) ,a na v e r a g ef u n dh a d$ 7 3 2m i l l i o no fa s s e t sa n de x p e r i e n c e da ni n ° o wo f$ 5 0m i l l i o n
or 5.4% per year, ranging from $215 million out°ow for the bottom quintile to $460 million
in°ow for the top quintile.
Note that our data set contains only funds that were still in operation in the beginning
of 1999 and is survivorship biased. However, it is straightforward to show that it does not
a®ect the consistency of OLS or WLS estimates, if past °ows do not in°uence the probability
of fund survival in a joint regression with returns. This assumption is fully in line with the
empirical ¯ndings in Brown and Goetzmann [1995]. Not surprisingly, Chevalier and Ellison
[1997], Goetzmann and Peles [1997], and Sirri and Tufano [1998] ¯nd the same results for
survivorship biased and unbiased samples.
Traditionally (see, e.g., Gruber [1996]), net absolute °ows are de¯ned as the change in
fund assets net of reinvested dividends:
5Fi;t = TNAi;t ¡ TNAi;t¡1(1 + Ri;t); (1)
where TNAi;t denotes fund i's total net assets at the end of month t and Ri;t is return of
fund i in month t. Similarly, net relative °ows are de¯ned as a net percentage growth of
fund assets:
fi;t =






Both de¯nitions are based on an assumption that all investor earnings are automatically
reinvested in the fund and °ows occur at the end of month t. To account for the impact
of the in°ation, we de°ate funds' total net asset values by the US consumer price index
and convert them into equivalent US dollars, as of December 1990 before computing °ow
measures.
Almost all studies referred to in the previous section analyze °ows at the annual fre-
quency, assuming that the sensitivity of °ows with respect to past performance is the same
for all funds. Thus, the standard model in the literature speci¯es net relative °ows as a
l i n e a rf u n c t i o no fp a s tp e r f o r m a n c ea n das e to fc o n t r o lv a r i a b l e s :
fi;t = a + b1ri;t¡1 + ::: + bKri;t¡K + c0xi;t¡1 + ui;t; (3)
where ri;t¡i is some measure of fund i's performance (e.g., raw return, Jensen's alpha, or cor-
responding ranking) in period t¡i and xi;t¡1 includes such variables as fund size, age, fees,
a measure of riskiness, and performance of other funds in the family. The assumption that
the °ow-performance sensitivity coe±cients b1 to bK d on o td e p e n do nf u n dc h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,
such as size and age, is clearly restrictive. Moreover, one should keep in mind that small
funds have extreme relative °ows that dominate OLS estimates. Unless heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are computed, inference based on OLS estimates will be biased.
For e±ciency reasons, we model the variance of the error term and compute weighted least
squares estimates.
In this paper, we try to model the impact of past performance on °ows in a less re-
s t r i c t i v ew a y . W ew r i t eo u rm o d e l¯ r s ti nt e r m so fa b s o l u t e° o w s ,w h e r ew es p e c i f yb o t h
the performance-unrelated part and the °ow-performance sensitivity of the °ow model as
polynomials in logs of fund size and age:
Fi;t = G(TNAi;t¡1;age i;t¡1)+H(TNAi;t¡1;age i;t¡1)
60 X
j=1
wjRARi;t¡j + ei;t; (4)
where functions G and H approximate the unknown functional form of the performance-
unrelated and performance-related parts of the relationship between °ows and performance.
6The empirical results to be presented later suggest that a speci¯cation with second-order
polynomials in logs of fund size and age su±ces.1
Equivalently, we can rewrite the model in terms of relative °ows. After dividing both
sides of (4) by TNAi;t¡1, we obtain
fi;t = g(TNAi;t¡1;age i;t¡1)+h(TNAi;t¡1;age i;t¡1)
60 X
j=1
wjRARi;t¡j +~ ei;t; (5)
where g(¢) ´ G(¢)=TNAi;t¡1, h(¢) ´ H(¢)=TNAi;t¡1,a n d~ ei;t ´ ei;t=TNAi;t¡1.
Fund performance over the past ¯ve years is measured as a weighted sum of past risk-
adjusted returns de¯ned on the basis of the four-factor model with the market, size, book-
to-market, and one year momentum factors2, as in Carhart [1997]:








where Ft =( Rm
t¡j ¡ R
f
t¡j;SMB t¡j;HML t¡j;MOM t¡j)a n d^ ¯1
i ;:::; ^ ¯4
i are estimated using
all observations available for a given fund. In order to ensure the smoothness of the impulse
response function, we impose a polynomial structure on the performance coe±cients. We
approximate the distribution of the lag coe±cients on risk-adjusted returns by a polynomial




µkk!j¡k for j =1 ;:::;60: (7)
The empirical results indicate that p = 5 su±ces. Since we expect that the impact of past
performance disappears after at most ¯ve years, we impose the end-point restriction that
w61 = 0. In order to identify the model, we normalize the weights, so that the average of
the performance coe±cients is equal to one: 1
60
P60
j=1 wj =1 : The performance coe±cients
represent the weights with which investors take past performance into account. If all weights
are equal to each other (i.e. µk =0f o rk>0), the weighted sum of risk-adjusted returns
in (4) equals Jensen's alpha over a ¯ve-year estimation period.
Throughout the paper, we compute weighted least squares estimates where the variance
of ei;t is modelled as
Va r(ei;t)=e x pU(TNAi;t¡1;age i;t¡1); (8)
with U being a second-order polynomial in logs of fund size and age. This speci¯cation
re°ects that the disturbances of both the absolute °ows speci¯cation (4) and the relative
1The joint hypothesis that the third-order terms are zero is not rejected at the conventional con¯dence level.
2We thank Kenneth R. French for the opportunity to use the factor returns provided at his website
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html).
7°ows speci¯cations (5) are heteroskedastic, in contrast to what is often assumed in the
literature. The coe±cients of the function U are estimated on the basis of the OLS residuals.
We estimate the model parameters in (4) by means of a concentrated least-squares ap-
proach. For the pre-speci¯ed values of the parameters in the function H, the model (4)
is linear in the remaining parameters. Therefore, the least squares estimates can conve-
niently be computed by numerically maximizing the concentrated sum of squares over the
parameters in the function H.
3 Basic results
At y p i c a le x a m p l eo fas p e c i ¯ c a t i o nc o n s i d e r e di nt h el i t e r a t u r ei s
fi;t = a + c1 logTNAi;t¡1 + c2 logagei;t¡1 + b®i;t + ui;t; (9)
where fund performance is measured as Jensen's alpha ®i;t over a ¯ve-year period. This
is equivalent to imposing w1 = ::: = w60 = 1
60 in our basic speci¯cation (5). Moreover,
the performance-unrelated part of the model, g in (5), is speci¯ed as being linear in logs
of fund size and age, while the °ow-performance sensitivity, h in (5), is simply taken to be
constant.
The estimation results for the model (9) are reported in Table 2. In line with the existing
evidence, we ¯nd that better performing funds, smaller funds, and younger funds attract
larger relative °ows. The dependence of the performance-unrelated part of the speci¯cation
f o rr e l a t i v e° o w s( t h ef u n c t i o ng)o nf u n ds i z ea n da g ei si l l u s t r a t e dg r a p h i c a l l yi nP a n e l
Ao fF i g u r e1 . 3 This ¯gure shows that the expected °ows of funds with a neutral past
performance (i.e., with Jensen's alpha equal to zero) range from -3% for large old funds
to 9% for small young funds. The model imposes that the °ow-performance sensitivity of
relative °ows (the function h) is constant over funds (see Panel B in Figure 1). It predicts
that 1% change in Jensen's alpha will lead to 3.8% change in expected relative °ows, which
is consistent with the ¯ndings in, e.g., Chevalier and Ellison [1997]. It can readily be seen
that the current speci¯cation may be too restrictive, since it predicts negative °ows for old
funds with neutral performance and the same sensitivity for the smallest and the largest
funds.
The estimation results for the basic speci¯cation as put forward in (4) to (8) are pre-
sented in the third and fourth columns of Table 3. All coe±cients are highly signi¯cant,
3In all graphs depicting expected fund °ows as a function of size and age, size and age axes start from $250
million and 5 years, respectively. We exclude the segment of the smallest funds because of the large standard
errors of their expected relative °ows.
8which allows us to reject the hypothesis that the sensitivity of °ows to performance is the
same for all funds. The expected performance-unrelated °ows rise from 0.5% for large
old funds to 2% for large young funds and 10-16% for small young funds (see Panel A in
Figure 2). This pattern looks much more reasonable than the one based on the restric-
tive speci¯cation (9) typically used in the literature. The peak of 16% in the segment of
smallest youngest funds can be explained by the observation that smallest funds tend to
have negative Jensen's alpha in a range from -2% to -3%, which compensates the peak.
The °ow-performance sensitivity is also higher for smaller and younger funds (see Panel
B in Figure 2). It ranges from 0.5% for large old funds to 5-8% for small young funds.
Thus, °ows to small and, to some extent, young funds appear much more sensitive to past
performance than °ows to large and old funds. One possible explanation is that investors
invest approximately equal dollar amounts in the best performing funds, irrespective of
their current size, which would make the relative °ow to small funds much more sensitive
to past performance. Moreover, investors may be more sensitive to the recent performance
of young funds, since they have not yet obtained the reputation established by the old
funds.
The hypothesis that average past risk-adjusted performance over a ¯ve-year period
determines subsequent in°ows, i.e., that µk =0f o rk>0, is strongly rejected. The
impact of past performance on subsequent °ows that is implied by (9) and the estimated
µ's is illustrated in Panel A of Figure 3. The information content of past performance rises
during the ¯rst eight months and then gradually decreases towards zero. As indicated by the
con¯dence bands in Panel A of Figure 3, the speci¯cation on the basis of average past risk-
adjusted performance at annual or quarterly frequency is strongly rejected. Current °ows
are most strongly a®ected by the performance from 6 to 8 months ago. The performance
during the most recent quarter appears less important than performance during the rest of
the past year. This suggests that information dissemination takes time and some investors
react to fund performance with a certain lag. Consistent with previous ¯ndings (see, e.g.,
Sirri and Tufano [1998]), fund performance during the most recent year has the strongest
impact on °ows, accounting for 43% of the total impact. The sensitivity of °ows to past
performance fades away after a period of three years.
Formal tests of statistical signi¯cance of the results are reported in Panel A of Table 4. In
the lower diagonal part of the table we present p-values of Wald tests of the hypothesis that
the impact of past performance i months ago equals that of j months ago: H0 : wi = wj:
The upper diagonal part of the table reports p-values of Wald tests of the hypothesis that
the impact of average past performance i quarters ago equals that of j quarters ago: H0 :
w3i¡2+ w3i¡1 +w3i = w3j¡2+ w3j¡1 +w3j: The table indicates that the impact of average
performance three quarters ago di®ers signi¯cantly from the impact of average performance
9one, two and four quarters ago (p-values of 0.0058, 0.0019, and 0.0001, respectively).
4 Extension of the sample period using quarterly
data on Total Net Assets
In this section, we estimate the lag structure of the °ow-performance relationship over a
longer time span, from 1976 to 1998. Since the data on funds' total net assets before 1991
are only available at quarterly frequency, we calculate quarterly °ows from the monthly
°ows over that quarter. After adding the basic equation (4) for three consecutive months
and dividing by 3, we obtain
1














Since monthly °ows in (4) are annualized, the left-hand side of the equation is equal to the
annualized quarterly net °ow realized during months t¡2t ot: Fi;t:t¡2.S i n c em o n t h l yn e t
assets values are not observed for the ¯rst part of the sample period we approximate the
speci¯cation by
Fi;t:t¡2 = G(TNAi;t¡3;age i;t¡3)+
H(TNAi;t¡3;age i;t¡3)
P60
j=1 wj(RARi;t¡j + RARi;t¡j¡1 + RARi;t¡j¡2)+~ ei;t:
(11)
We estimate the °ow-performance relationship combining the modi¯ed model (11) for quar-
terly °ows during the ¯rst part of the sample period (1976-1990) and basic model (4) for
monthly °ows during the second part of the sample period (1991-1998). We impose the
same identifying and end-point restrictions and polynomial structure, as before (see (6) and
(7)). The last two columns of Table 3 and Panel B in Table 4 report the results, which are
very similar to those based only on monthly °ows in 1991-1998. The parameters in the G
and H functions are estimated more precisely due to the additional information about the
quarterly °ows in 70s and 80s. The lag structure has the same general shape as before,
with the impact of performance on °ows rising during the ¯rst three quarters ago and fad-
ing subsequently to zero (see Panel B in Figure 3). Note that the standard errors of the
performance coe±cients have somewhat increased, which could be explained by temporal
changes in the lag structure.
105 Convexity of the °ow-performance relationship
In the previous sections, we assumed that the °ow-performance relationship is the same
for good and bad performers. In this section, we re-examine the existing evidence on non-
linearity of the °ow-performance relationship by allowing the impact of past performance
to be di®erent in each of ¯ve segments corresponding to performance quintiles based on
¯ve-year Jensen's alpha. The kink points between the segments are the quintile points of
the estimated distribution of Jensen's alphas. Formally, we rewrite the basic model (4) as





wj(p)RARi;t¡j + ei;t; (12)
where we allow each performance coe±cient wj to be di®erent across quintiles. We impose





j=1 wj(p) = 1 and specify a polynomial structure of




k!µk(p)j¡k for j =1 ;:::;60: (13)
The end-point restriction is imposed in every segment. Table 5 (columns three and four)
presents the results. The impulse response function is very similar in all quintiles, as the
°ow-performance sensitivity peaks in a period 6-8 months ago and then converges towards
zero (see Panel A in Figure 4). However, °ows to the better-performing funds appear much
more sensitive to past performance than °ows to badly performing funds. The hypothesis of
linearity of the °ow-performance relationship, formulated in terms of the average quintile-




j wj(r); 8p;r, is clearly rejected.
The corresponding Wald test has a p-value below 0.0001. Thus, we ¯nd that the well-
documented convexity of °ows with respect to past performance found in other studies
(see, e.g., Chevalier and Ellison [1997] and Sirri and Tufano [1998]) is robust to allowing
for dependence of this relationship on size and age of the fund. Apparently, this convexity
is mostly due to the di®erence in °ow-performance sensitivity between the top three and
bottom two performance quintiles. As reported in the lower diagonal part of Table 6, all but
one pair-wise di®erences in the average performance coe±cients between the quintiles from
these segments are signi¯cant at 1% level. The convexity pattern is illustrated in Panel B
of Figure 4, which depicts relative °ows as a function of the outperformance with respect
to the market for an average fund and funds with di®erent combinations of size and age.
According to our model, an average fund is expected to lose about 12% in out°ows when
underperforming the market by 5% per year and is expected to gain about 18% in in°ows
when outperforming the market by 3% per year. Given the same performance, a small old
11fund would lose about 14% in out°ows, while small young fund would attract about 40%
in°ows. As we saw before, °ows to large funds are much less sensitive to past performance.
6 The impact of benchmark risk
So far, we have demonstrated a strong positive relation between fund °ows and risk-adjusted
returns. Similar results can be obtained for raw returns, since raw and risk-adjusted returns
of US growth funds are highly correlated. An interesting question is whether raw returns
add something to risk-adjusted returns in explaining fund °ows. To answer that question,
we add raw returns as one more performance measure to our basic model (4):








where as before we impose a polynomial structure, the end-point restrictions, and an identi-
fying restriction that 1
60
P60
j=1(wj+vj) = 1. Note that since raw returns can be disentangled
into the risk-adjusted and systematic risk components (factors are de¯ned as in (6)):








we can rewrite the model (14) as


















T h ee s t i m a t i o nr e s u l t sa r ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l e7a n dF i g u r e5 .W e¯ n dt h a tb o t ht y p e s
of performance are positively related to °ows. The results indicate that the ~ vj coe±cients
are small, but statistically signi¯cant. The recent outperformance on the systematic risk
factors does yield additional in°ow, which indicates that some mutual fund investors are
style timers. The inclusion of the ~ vj coe±cients hardly a®ects the estimates of the ~ wj
coe±cients.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we analyze the dynamic structure of the impact of past performance on fund
°ows. The °ow-performance relationship is estimated at the monthly frequency, allowing for
12dependence of the sensitivity of °ows to past performance on size and age of the fund. Tra-
ditional model speci¯cations in the literature based on average past performance at annual
or quarterly frequency are strongly rejected. We ¯nd that the impact of past performance
on °ows does not monotonically decay with time. Performance from 6 to 8 months ago
seems to have the strongest impact on net °ows to US growth funds. We observe that fund
°ows are less sensitive to performance during the most recent quarter than to performance
during the remaining three quarters of the ¯rst year. This can be explained by information
dissemination taking time and some investors reacting to fund performance with a certain
lag. The impact of past performance on °ows is mostly limited to the three most recent
years of performance history, which accounts for about 90% of the total impact.
The well-documented convexity of the °ow-performance relationship is robust to allow-
ing for our more °exible dynamic lag structure and dependence of this relationship on size
and age of the fund. This convexity seems to be mostly due to the di®erence in °ows be-
tween the top performing half of the funds and bottom performing half of the funds. Within
each of these two segments the °ow-performance relationship appears close to linear, which
suggests that funds with the average performance have more incentives to take excessive
risk as a result of the convexity in the °ow-performance relationship.
Finally, we ¯nd that performance on systematic risk factors has a small positive impact
on °ows in excess of the impact of the risk-adjusted returns. This suggests that some
mutual fund investors are style timers choosing funds on the basis of their raw rather than
risk-adjusted performance. However, this ¯nding could be speci¯c for our sample period
(1991-1998), during most of which the systematic factors realized positive returns.
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15Table 1
Summary statistics of the US growth funds, 1991-1998
The table reports summary statistics of the US growth funds during the main sample
period (1991-1998). Columns 2 and 3 report mean and standard deviation, while the last
two columns present means of the fund characteristics in the respective top and bottom
quintiles. Note that Jensen's alpha, absolute and relative °ows are annualized.





Absolute °ow, $ mln 49.87 382.57 -214.95 460.74
Relative °ow, % 5.36 40.59 -36.00 61.34
Total Net Assets, $ mln 732.35 1228.44 18.25 2617.05
Age, years 16.27 10.37 5.98 31.29
Jensen's alpha, % -0.13 3.24 -4.50 4.42
Nonsystematic risk, % 17.53 6.46 10.56 27.53
Table 2
Flow-performance relationship: a typical model in the literature
The table reports coe±cient estimates based on the typical model used in the literature (9)
for the period 1991-1998. The dependent variable is fund net relative °ow. The independent
variables include a constant, log of fund size, log of fund age, and ¯ve-year Jensen's alpha.







Lag structure of the °ow-performance relationship
Columns 3 and 4 of the table report coe±cient estimates based on the basic speci¯cation
(4) for the period 1991-1998. The last two columns of the table report coe±cient estimates
based on the speci¯cation (11) for the period 1976-1998, including the period 1976-1990 with
quarterly data on °ows. The dependent variable is fund net absolute °ow. The independent
variables include the performance-unrelated term and °ow-performance sensitivity times
weighted sum of past 60 monthly risk-adjusted returns. Both the performance-unrelated
term and °ow-performance sensitivity are modelled as a quadratic function of logs of fund
size and age. The performance coe±cients are restricted to lie on a polynomial of the ¯fth
order (see (7)). Note that °ows and Jensen's alpha are annualized.
Coef S.e. Coef S.e.
Performance- Const 202.42 14.691 198.49 12.741
unrelated logTNA 61.96 4.354 57.23 3.959
°ows log2 TNA 4.93 0.434 4.23 0.377
(function G)l o g age -77.63 9.010 -79.58 6.604
log2 age 7.73 1.481 7.69 1.063
logTNA¤ logage -11.07 1.096 -11.13 0.875
Flow- Const 66.15 5.149 39.5 3.929
performance logTNA 25.53 1.041 12.56 1.109
sensitivity log2 TNA 2.53 0.085 1.19 0.097
(function H)l o g age -13.89 3.087 -11.8 1.663
log2 age 1.00 0.480 1.41 0.226
logTNA¤ logage -2.22 0.258 -1.12 0.183
Lag structure µ0 -0.02 0.001 -0.02 0.001
of past µ1 1.19 0.049 1.17 0.084
performance µ2 -4.40 0.406 -4.25 0.688
µ3 4.62 0.665 4.42 1.134
µ4 -1.58 0.295 -1.51 0.506
µ5 0.15 0.032 0.14 0.055
17Table 4
Tests of the hypotheses about the lag structure of the °ow-performance
relationship
Panels A and B of the table describes tests based on the basic speci¯cation (4) for the
periods 1991-1998 and 1976-1998, respectively. The lower diagonal part of the table presents
p-values of the tests of the hypothesis that the impact of past performance i months ago
equals that of j months ago, H0 : wi = wj. The upper diagonal part of the table reports
p- v a l u e so ft h et e s t so ft h eh y p o t h e s i st h a tt h ei m p a c to fp a s tp e r f o r m a n c ei quarters ago
equals that of j quarters ago, H0 : w3i¡2+ w3i¡1 + w3i = w3j¡2+ w3j¡1 + w3j.
Panel A. Sample period 1991-1998
inj 123456789 1 0
1 -0 . 1 1 4 40 . 0 0 5 80 . 0 4 0 70 . 6 1 3 00 . 2 5 3 40 . 0 0 7 50 . 0 0 0 10 . 0 0 0 00 . 0 0 0 0
2 0.7594 - 0.0019 0.5891 0.0554 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
3 0.6053 0.3921 - 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
4 0.5908 0.4109 0.8621 - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
5 0.2478 0.1773 0.5767 0.0237 - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
6 0.0933 0.0684 0.2952 0.0023 0.0000 - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
7 0.0515 0.0360 0.1928 0.0008 0.0001 0.0029 - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
8 0.0465 0.0297 0.1743 0.0011 0.0014 0.0692 0.6831 - 0.0000 0.0000
9 0.0613 0.0358 0.2083 0.0041 0.0238 0.4620 0.4817 0.0446 - 0.0000
10 0 . 0 9 9 30 . 0 5 4 90 . 2 9 6 70 . 0 2 1 10 . 1 8 3 20 . 8 0 1 00 . 0 8 5 10 . 0 0 2 00 . 0 0 0 0 -
Panel B. Sample period 1976-1998
inj 1234567891 0
1 - 0.4337 0.115 0.3386 0.8073 0.1388 0.0091 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000
2 0.5319 - 0.0804 0.9441 0.1407 0.0053 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
3 0.8241 0.6345 - 0.0106 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
4 0.7603 0.6036 0.9747 - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
5 0.9561 0.4003 0.6952 0.1710 - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
6 0.7221 0.2653 0.5026 0.0689 0.0102 - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
7 0.6208 0.2084 0.4179 0.0462 0.0205 0.1085 - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
8 0.6200 0.2000 0.4067 0.0563 0.0768 0.3881 0.9953 - 0.0000 0.0000
9 0.6883 0.2237 0.4511 0.1014 0.2472 0.8482 0.4972 0.1449 - 0.0000
10 0 . 8 0 4 70 . 2 7 3 80 . 5 4 4 00 . 2 0 8 10 . 5 7 2 70 . 6 7 9 40 . 1 9 6 60 . 0 3 5 80 . 0 0 4 1 -
18Table 5
Quintile-speci¯c lag structure of the °ow-performance relationship
The table reports coe±cient estimates based on the model (12) for the period 1991-1998.
The dependent variable is fund net absolute °ow. The independent variables include the
performance-unrelated term and °ow-performance sensitivity times weighted sum of past 60
monthly risk-adjusted returns. Both the performance-unrelated term and °ow-performance
sensitivity are modelled as a quadratic function of logs of fund size and age. The quintile-
speci¯c performance coe±cients are restricted to lie on a polynomial of the ¯fth order (see
(13)). The quintiles are de¯ned on the basis of the ¯ve-year Jensen's alpha. Note that °ows
and Jensen's alpha are annualized.
Coef S.e.
Performance- Const 165.42 20.748
unrelated logTNA 48.48 8.331
°ows log2 TNA 3.69 0.866
(function G)l o g age -67.59 7.860
log2 age 6.91 1.326
logTNA¤ logage -9.45 1.065
Flow- Const 62.94 5.369
performance logTNA 24.4 1.123
sensitivity log2 TNA 2.44 0.098
(function H)l o g age -13.45 3.321
log2 age 1.01 0.543
logTNA¤ logage -2.16 0.276
Lag structure µ0 -0.01 0.002
in the bottom µ1 0.94 0.168




19Lag structure µ0 -0.01 0.003





Lag structure µ0 -0.02 0.003





Lag structure µ0 -0.02 0.002





Lag structure µ0 -0.02 0.002
in the top µ1 1.67 0.144





Tests of the hypotheses about the quintile-speci¯c lag structure
of the °ow-performance relationship
The table describes tests based on the speci¯cation (12) for the period 1991-1998. The
lower diagonal part of the table presents p-values of the tests of the hypothesis that the









3 0.0327 0.0005 -
4 0.0079 0.0000 0.7784 -
5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0877 0.1688 -
21Table 7
Lag structure of the °ow-performance relationship:
raw vs. risk-adjusted performance
The table reports coe±cient estimates based on the model (14) for the period 1991-1998.
The dependent variable is fund net absolute °ow. The independent variables include the
performance-unrelated term and °ow-performance sensitivity times weighted sum of past
60 monthly risk-adjusted returns and past 60 raw returns. Both the performance-unrelated
term and °ow-performance sensitivity are modelled as a quadratic function of logs of fund
size and age. The coe±cients on raw and risk-adjusted returns are restricted to lie on a
polynomial of the ¯fth order (see (7)). Note that °ows and Jensen's alpha are annualized.
Coef S.e.
Performance- Const 11.9 37.865
unrelated logTNA -6.93 13.692
°ows log2 TNA -1.64 1.324
(function G)l o g age -30.19 10.757
log2 age 3.7 1.319
logTNA¤ logage -4.28 1.437
Flow- Const 68.25 5.145
performance logTNA 27.11 1.027
sensitivity log2 TNA 2.69 0.090
(function H)l o g age -12.82 3.125
log2 age 0.69 0.499
logTNA¤ logage -2.29 0.246
Lag structure, µ0 -0.02 0.001
risk-adjusted µ1 1.18 0.102




Lag structure, µ0 0.00 0.001





22Figure 1. Expected fund °ows as a function of size and age (standard model)
Panels A and B show the performance-unrelated °ows (°ows of a fund with zero Jensen's
alpha) and °ow-performance sensitivity (change in fund °ows due to 1% increase in Jensen's
alpha), predicted by the standard model in the literature (9). The performance-unrelated
°ows are modelled as linear in logs of size and age. The °ow-performance sensitivity is
assumed to be constant.
23Figure 2. Expected fund °ows as a function of size and age (our model)
Panels A and B show the performance-unrelated °ows (°ows of a fund with zero Jensen's
alpha) and °ow-performance sensitivity (change in fund °ows due to 1% increase in Jensen's
alpha), based on the basic speci¯cation (4) for the period 1991-1998. Both the performance-
unrelated °ows and °ow-performance sensitivity are modelled as a quadratic function in
logs of fund size and age.
24Figure 3. Impact of past performance on °ows
The graph shows the lag structure of the impact of past 60 monthly risk-adjusted returns
on current °ows. The performance coe±cients are restricted to lie on a polynomial of the
¯fth order (see (7)). Panels A and B are based on the basic speci¯cation (4) for the period
1991-1998 and modi¯ed speci¯cation (11) for the period 1976-1998 (including the period
1976-1990 with quarterly data on °ows), respectively.
25Figure 4. Quintile-speci¯c impact of past performance on °ows
Panel A shows the lag structure of the impact of past 60 monthly risk-adjusted returns
on current °ows, based on the model (12) for the period 1991-1998. The quintile-speci¯c
performance coe±cients are restricted to lie on a polynomial of the ¯fth order (see (13)).
The performance quintiles are de¯ned on the basis of the ¯ve-year Jensen's alpha. Panel
B depicts expected °ows for funds with ¯ve di®erent combinations of size and age. An
average fund has an age of 16 years and $732 mln in assets. Small and large funds have
a size of $250 mln and $8 bln, while young and old funds have an age of 5 and 50 years,
respectively.
26Figure 5. Impact of raw and risk-adjusted performance on °ows
The graph shows the lag structure of the net impact of past 60 monthly risk-adjusted
and raw returns on current °ows, based on the model (14) for the period 1991-1998. The
coe±cients on raw and risk-adjusted returns are restricted to lie on a polynomial of the
¯fth order (see (7)).
27